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and Frank R. Baumgartner 
This paper examines the spending behavior of candidates for the U,S. House of Representa- 
tives. Particular attention is paid to the timing of receipts and expenditures over the 
complete 2-year election cycle. Incumbents raise and spend large amounts of money very 
early in the race, and this preemptive spending may have a groat impact on the selection of 
challengers and therefore on electoral outcomes. In addition, a model of reactive spending 
is tested for the general election period. Incumbents' expenditures are a function of the 
underlying partisan division in the district, the strength of the challenge, and candidates' 
feelings of vulnerability. Ineumbents are strategic actors who attempt to maximize their 
chances of reelection. Early in the term, they spend preemptively in an effort to influence 
the selection of their challengers. Later in the term, they spend in reaction to the strength 
of their challengers' campaign. The role of money in congressional campaigns is neither 
simple nor direct. More attention needs to be given to the strategic uses of money in the 
period leading up to the general election campaign as well as to the dynamics of receipts 
and expenditures over an entire election cycle. 
Past scholarly work on the uses and consequences of money in campaigns 
has emphasized the direct effects of money spent on winning general elec- 
tions. But incumbents spend for many different reasons, only one of which 
is to guarantee victory in a general election race with a particular chal- 
lenger. Candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives are assembling 
war chests of campaign funds earlier in the 2-year cycle and in greater 
quantity than ever before; and most incumbents are finishing their cam- 
paigns with substantial cash balances, which they carry over to the next 
electoral cycle. These actions raise new questions about the strategic uses of 
money in campaigns as it b~omes clear that not all of the incumbents' 
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funds are being raised or spent in the traditional general election period to 
defeat a known challenger. 
The timing of fund-raising across the biennial electoral cycle, the sym- 
bolic importance of large cash balances, and the use of surpluses from 
previous campaigns are new weapons for incumbents in their pursuit of 
increased seniority. Interested in securing reelection, they have the poten- 
tial to use money to affect decisions about who their challengers might 
b e -  in the context of the current race as well as in the future. In this sense, 
incumbents clearly have the ability to spend "preemptively" in order to 
structure the nature of the contest which they" will face. 
The research reported here takes a broader perspective on the uses and 
consequences of money in campaigns by examining patterns of spending 
across the entire interelection period. The first section presents a review of 
recent research findings on campaign spending. Next, patterns of early 
spending by incumbents before their challengers are known are identified. 
Then a revised model of reactive spending is proposed and tested, and 
finally, by examining deviant cases, additional factors are identified that 
are likely to affect incumbents' spending behavior during the general elec- 
tion period. 
RESEARCH ON CAMPAIGN SPENDING 
Most research on the consequences of money in congressional elections 
pays little attention to the dynamic elements of continuous campaigning. 
To date this research has followed two separate but related paths. One has 
emphasized the process of financing campaigns, focusing upon contribu- 
tors. The findings indicate that incumbents are clearly advantaged over 
their challengers in raising funds. Political Action Committees (PACs) with 
economic interests tend to support incumbents over challengers (Welch, 
1980), and there is widespread concern about the implications of the in- 
creasing reliance of incumbents on the funds provided by special interest 
groups. 
The other major path is concerned with the uses of a variety of resources 
in campaigns as they relate to electoral success. Previous work shows that 
incumbents approach the general election campaign period with substan- 
tial advantages. Cover (1977) and Cover and Brumberg (1982) emphasized 
the significance of perquisites of office; Fiorina (1977), their ombudsman's 
role; Mayhew (1974a and 1974b) and Fiorina (1974), their issue positions; 
Fenno (1978), their contact with constituents and trips back home to the 
district; Hinckley (1980) and Ragsdale (1981), their visibility advantage; 
and Jaeobson (1978), the role of money. 
As Jacobson (1978) demonstrated, high expenditures are not necessarily 
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associated with large electoral margins. The more challengers spend, the 
better they do; but the more incumbents spend, the worse they do. Incum- 
bents who spend a lot do so in response to serious opposition, leading to the 
seemingly counterintuitive relationship between their own effort and suc- 
cess. Thus the concept of "reactive spending" was born as a reflection of a 
candidate's investment in fund-raising and resulting levels of expenditure 
in response to the seriousness of the challenge. 
Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) extended the concept of vulnerability 
through the use of survey-based measures of the candidates' chances of 
beating the opponent. Using a measure of uncertainty of the outcome, they 
show that even a distinction between incumbents and challengers is inade- 
quate to explain levels of spending unless it also incorporates a measure of 
whether candidates think they can win or not. By distingnaishing between 
an incumbent who is a "sure winner" as opposed to a "vulnerable" and 
between a challenger who is a "hopeful" as opposed to a "sure loser," an 
even greater explanation of levels of campaign spending is possible. In fact, 
there are classes of challengers (Hopefuls) who spend more on average than 
classes of incumbents (Sure Winners). 
This concept of an incumbent's vulnerability is composed of two distinct 
factors. One is a short-term concern with the contest at hand and getting 
reelected. This is largely a function of the strength and resources of the 
challenger, but it might also result from a problem brought on by the 
incumbent since the last election such as a personal scandal. Some incum- 
bents will have been targeted for attention by special interest groups which 
disagree with their voting records. Attacks by these groups provide ammu- 
nition for the opposition. In addition, they solicit their members for contri- 
butions to be used as independent expenditures in negative campaigns 
against the incumbent. 
A second aspect of vulnerability derives from a concern with election 
realities that are present every 2 years regardless of the specific challenger. 
This form of vulnerability is largely a function of the distribution of parti- 
sanship in the district. The safety of the district can affect both the incum- 
bent's perspective on career planning as well as the quality of the opposi- 
tion that will emerge from the other party at some time in the future. 
While either kind of vulnerability should lead to heavy spending in the 
general election period, there is a much more limited set of circumstances 
under which early or "preemptive" spending should appear even before an 
opponent is known. One is when a scandal has occurred during the current 
term; although such incidents are uncommon, they do affect some mem- 
bers in each term. A second is when the district has been historically 
competitive and strong challenges are quite common. And a third is when 
an incumbent has aspirations for higher office or for greater political clout 
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in Congress in the form of a better committee assignment, a chairmanship, 
or some other leadership position. 
Preemptive fund-raising and spending involve assembling cash in antici- 
pation of a serious challenge, often when the specific challenger is un- 
known, as well as spending money in advance of the general election 
campaign in order to maintain contact with constituents and to dissuade 
serious challenges. In this formulation, time (or timing) assumes added 
importance because the model implies anticipatory spending behavior on 
the part of incumbents rather than just reactive spending. In the general 
election campaign, reactive spending may become unnecessary because 
potentially strong opponents have already dropped out of the pool of pos- 
sible challengers in the face of large sums of money stockpiled by an 
apparently invincible incumbent. There is no reason to assume that incum- 
bents are disinterested in who their challengers will be nor that they will sit 
back to find out who the other party will select as the most worthy oppo- 
nent. Moreover, fully appreciating the dynamics of the process over succes- 
sive elections, incumbents may work hard in the earlier stages of their 
career to insure that successive reelection efforts are easier. 
For another class of candidates, large electoral margins may be the key 
to advancing their political careers. Some want to pursue positions of 
leadership and greater responsibility in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
Others seek elective office which involves a larger consti tuency-running 
for governor or for the U.S. Senate. In either case, demonstrating an ability 
to raise large sums of money and to win with large margins can increase 
their visibility and attractiveness as candidates for higher office. Making 
contributions to the campaigns of colleagues from the same state delega- 
tion or committee who have been less active or successful at raising money 
can cement alliances which will be useful later when party assignments are 
being handed out or when seeking higher office. And, of course, campaign 
surpluses provide a head start on fund raising for subsequent campaigns 
for statewide office that will inevitably be more expensive. 
Until recently, scholars concentrated on general election spending be- 
havior, although they were forced to rely upon 2-year expenditure totals 
provided by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) for their analyses. 
This reflected too narrow a definition of the campaign period and used an 
available but inadequate measure of spending behavior. Now, the process 
of continuous campaigning by incumbents is more clearly understood 
(Fenno, 1978), and researchers should broaden their view of spending be- 
havior to take in the entire interelection period. Of equal significance, 
researchers can now examine spending over time, thereby overcoming a 
measurement problem which has delayed theoretical development. The 
current availability of more detailed receipt and expenditure data over 
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time from the FEC makes the preliminary analysis of preemptive behavior 
possible. 
Taking advantage of this opportunity, the research reported here rests 
upon two sets of analyses. The first, which must remain essentially descrip- 
tive, investigates the patterns of fund-raising and expenditures across the 
period from January 1, 1977, to December 31, 1978, for candidates in a 
representative national sample of contested congressional races.l To pursue 
more detailed analyses of the effects of such behavior, particularly on the 
emergence of challengers, a novel and much more extensive data collection 
effort would have to be undertaken. This would involve identifying the 
pool of potential challengers in congressional races, including information 
on when they first thought about entering the race and what affected their 
decision to get out or stay in through the primary. Such information is not 
at present available, but it will be needed eventually in order to understand 
fully the consequences of the spending behavior of incumbents. 
The second part of the analysis concentrates on reactive spending, test- 
ing a revised and simplified model with improved measures of central 
concepts. The results enhance the predictive capacity of the Jacobson 
model rather than challenge it, and suggest fruitful avenues for future 
research on the effects of money in congressional elections. 
PATTERNS OF CANDIDATE SPENDING OVER TIME 
The importance of the strategic uses of campaign funds is highlighted 
when patterns of campaign spending are viewed over time. As the costs of 
campaigning have increased, so have the candidates' capacities to raise 
funds, particularly incumbents" While some may complain about the ef- 
fort involved in soliciting contributions, they nevertheless demonstrate in- 
creasing success, as measured by receipts. In fact, very few incumbents run 
campaigns with a deficit any longer, and may run substantial surpluses. -~ 
Another advantage which incumbents have is the availability of money 
at the beginning of the 2-year cycle. With surpluses and early contribu- 
tions, they can pace themselves better across the campaign and exert an 
influence on the nature of the opposition which they wilt eventually face. 
Until recently, data were not available which would permit analysis of 
candidates' receipts and expenditures over time. Through automation of 
their reports, the FEC has begun to make various indexes available which 
include summary data on candidates' financial activity by report type and 
time period. 3 When these data are assembled by quarter across the entire 
2-year interelection period, they present a picture of candidate activity 
which is quite different from what might be expected from the information 
on total expenditures alone. 
8 GOLDENBERG, TRAUGOTT, AND BAUMGARTNER 
An analysis of such data for the 1978 election cycle shows quite clearly 
that not only do incumbents spend more money overall than challengers, 
but they outspend them by substantial amounts early in the campaign. For 
incumbents, 30 cents of every dollar they eventually spent was allocated 
before July 1 of the election year, and almost 20 cents was spent before 
April'. In this representative national sample of contested House races, the 
incumbents spent an average of $17,170 in the odd-numbered year, usually 
long before their challenger was even identified in a midsummer or early 
fall primary. For their challengers, the average expenditure was less than 
$1,000, equivalent to only about 1% of their eventual campaign costs. ~ 
The sample also contained a limited number of candidates in open 
races. Their expenditures in the 2-year period were the highest, almost 
twice as great on the average as those of incumbents and three times as 
great as those of the challengers. These expenditures reflect the generally" 
greater levels of competition which are present when no incumbent is 
seeking reelection. Nevertheless, the off-year expenditures in these open 
races ($6,738) were less than those of the incumbents and about equal in 
percentage terms to those of challengers. These data indicate early ex- 
penditures by only half (11) of the candidates in open races, presumably 
because the incumbent did not announce retirement or die until late in the 
term. Only two of the candidates in open races spent any money at all in 
the first 6 months of 1977. 
The candidate selection process obviously differs for incumbents and the 
challengers who eventually oppose them. Challengers often face a long 
road to the nomination which may include competing with other candi- 
dates for the right to oppose the incumbent. Because some incumbents are 
very strong, the opposition party may have to recruit a candidate when 
none volunteers. 
For incumbents, on the other hand, the path to renomination is usually 
completely within their control. They simply have to decide whether or 
not to run again. But they may have additional motives which drive their 
campaign behavior, particularly at the start of the 2-year cycle. They may 
be insecure in their position and feel the need to start early, with the idea of 
scaring off a serious challenge or being ready if one emerges. For them, 
investment may pay off in an easier general election contest. Therefore, 
some incumbents start spending money long before their actual challenger 
is ever known. 
An incumbent's assessment of electoral risk includes an evaluation of the 
constituency's partisanship and the candidate's visibility and reputat ion-  
what the incumbent has to start w i t h - a n d  also such qualities of the 
challengers as their personal characteristics, experience, and financial re- 
sources. To capture these various elements in this calculus, the preferred 
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TABLE 1, Mean Expenditures over Time for Incumbents and Challengers by 
Assessments of Their Chances, 1977-1978 
Total Pre-July After 
1977 1978 July I, 1978 Total ~ 
Incumbents 
Sure Winners $15,285 $12,497 $ 45,326 $ 73,108 
(N = 49) 21% 17 62 100% 
Vulnerables $21,323 $24,400 $122,900 $168,623 
(N = 15) 13 % 14 73 100 % 
Challengers 
Hopefuls $ 1 ,548  $18,769 $ 67,049 $ 87,365 
(N = 43) 2 % 21 77 100 % 
Sure Losers $ 135 $ 6,009 $ 20,484 $ 26,628 
(N = 28) 0.5 % 23 77 100 % 
aFor the ease of calculating percentages, this total is the sum of the three means. 
measure of vulnerability is a survey-based one in which the candidate or a 
campaign official can provide detailed evaluations of the full range of 
factors which affect the likelihood of electoral success. 
Data are presented in Table 1 which show the relative timing and 
amounts of expenditures by candidates whose managers varied in their 
degree of confidence about the chances of winning. The data demonstrate 
the range of variation in effort and expenditures by candidates of each 
status. This indicator, measured in September and incorporating informa- 
tion about the campaign's resources as well as those of the challenger, 
appropriately discriminates levels of spending late in the campaign period. 
In order to measure the changes in vulnerability which candidates (or their 
managers) feel, such data should ideally be collected repeatedly across the 
campaign to reflect changing circumstances. Despite being recorded only 
at the start of the general election camp~iign, vulnerability appears to 
reflect differences in early campaign spending as well, probably because it 
incorporates characteristics of the district as well as those of the specific 
opponent. While incumbents on the average clearly outspend their chal- 
lengers, some types of challengers outspend some types of incumbents. 
Incumbents whose managers were confident of victory (Sure Winners) 
spent less than half as much as those who thought their opponent could 
make a race of it. Sure winners spent relatively little money early, about 
$15,000 on average in 1977 and another $12,500 in the first half of 1978. 
The Vulnerables, on the other hand, spent an average of more than 
$21,000 in 1977, and another $24,400 in 1978 before July 1. The relation- 
ship between perceptions of chances and spending by challengers is even 
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more dramatic. The very low spenders are candidates who knew they had 
no chance at all (Sure Losers). But challengers whose managers thought 
they might beat the incumbent (Hopefuls), even though this almost never 
happens in practice, spent more than three times as much overa l l -and 
more than the Sure Winners. Few of the challengers recorded anything in 
the way of expenditures in 1977 because they weren't selected yet, but the 
Hopefuls reported average expenditures of $18,769 (related to both the 
primary and general elections) in the first half of 1978. 
An indication of the degree to which preemptive fund-raising and 
spending may be at work can be found in the relationship between receipts 
and expenditures over time, particularly in the first 18 months of the 
campaign period. If candidates only raise and spend what they need at the 
time, there should be a relatively high and constant correlation between 
receipts and expenditures over time and across types of candidates. In fact, 
this turns out not to be the case. While candidates tend to spend most of 
what they accumulate by the end of the campaign, the relationship is not 
that strong in the early part of the period. 
If "available cash" is defined as the sum of the cash balance from the 
previous 6-month period plus the receipts during the current one, the 
correlation between available cash and expenditures is.5 (Pearsonian r) for 
incumbents in the last 6 months of 1977 and the first 6 months of 1978; 
their spending in the early period is only weakly related to available re- 
sources. In fact, they are consistently underspending relative to their cash 
on hand, building larger reserves. But in the last 6 months of the cam- 
paign, the correlation rises to .9. Challengers, on the other hand, more 
consistently spend whatever they collect. In the first half of 1978, the 
equivalent correlation between available cash and expenditures for chal- 
lengers is .7; it is .9 in the post-July period. 
There are many reasons for raising money early in the election cycle. 
Some incumbents may do it simply to get it over with or because it is easier 
to make their appeals before potential contributors are solicited by others. 
While some incumbents may have no intention of publicizing their bank- 
roll in order to discourage strong challengers, others engage in strategic 
fund raising for preemptive purposes, in order to influence the pool of 
potential challengers who might oppose them. These motives and behavior 
require further study. Regardless of their stated intentions, the early money 
that some incumbents accumulate and advertise probably does act to dis- 
courage potential challengers ff they know it is there. A definitive demon- 
stration of these effects awaits systematic study of the preprimary period. 
In summary, the data available on spending over time suggest that reac- 
tive spending captures only part of incumbents' behavior, There are other 
strategic uses for money beyond beating a general election opponent. 
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Money can be raised and spent preemptively to dissuade serious challeng- 
ers, especially by incumbents who feel vulnerable. Both objective and 
subjective measures of a candidate's electoral prospects are related to dif- 
ferent patterns of resource accumulation and expenditure. Once early 
campaign expenditures are identified and understood, it is possible to pur- 
sue more directly the consequences and significance of reactive spending in 
the general election period when the incumbents know who their oppo- 
nents will be. 
REACTIVE SPENDING IN THE GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN 
Jacobson (1980a) presented a model of reactive spending by incumbents 
which suggests they raise and spend money in reaction to how much their 
challengers spend. As suggested above, incumbents react both to the 
strength of their challenger and to their perception of their vulnerability in 
the district. Therefore, two distinet and important conceptual elements 
should be included in a model of incumbent spending. One deals with 
characteristies of the district; the other, with the characteristics of the two 
candidates. It is possible to substitute for Jacobson's 7-variable regression 
model of incumbent expenditures a 3-variable model which includes meas- 
ures of both conceptual elements. The three predictors are the following: 
(1) the challenger's general election expenditures in the post-July 1 period; 
(2) the assessment that incumbents or their campaign managers make 
regarding their vulnerability; and (3) a normal vote estimate of the 
strength of the incumbents' (and challengers') party in the district. ~ 
The most significant limitation of Jacobson's original data is the use of 
2-year expenditure totals, even though the notion of reactive spending is 
inappropriate early in the interelection period before the identity of the 
challenger is known. Treating aggregate expenditures across the entire 
biennial eycle as a lump sum amount is likely to detract from the explana- 
tory power of any model which applies specifically to the general election 
campaign. That problem is overcome by including only the post-July 1 
expenditures. 
The second variable is the incumbents' (or their campaign managers') 
subjective assessments of the seriousness of their challenges. This variable 
takes into account the specific facts about the race at hand, such as the 
previous experience of the challenger and the possible leadership status of 
the incumbent that Jacobson introduced separately in a series of variables 
measuring the relative party strength of the two candidates in the district. 6 
The normal vote estimate of the incumbent's party strength is the third 
variable. It distinguishes between districts which are generally disposed 
toward the party of the incumbent versus those which are not, largely 
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TABLE 2. Determinants of Incumbent Spending in General Election Campaign 
for a Sample of U.S. House Races, 1978 
Regression 
Coefficient t ratio 
Constant 44.10 
Challenger's Expenditures .25 2.80 
Vulnerability 41.12 3.30 RZ= .56 
Normal Vote - 1.77 - 2.21 (N= 63) 
independent of and uncontaminated by recent campaign effects. 
Table 2 presents the results of this model which states that: 
IE =](CE,VULN,NV) + e 
where IE is the incumbent's post-July 1 general election expenditures, CE is the 
challenger's post-July 1 general election expenditures, VULN is the incumbent's 
subjective assessment of vulnerability, and NV is the normal vote estimate of the 
strength of the incumbent's party. 
This 3-variable model explains substantially more of the variance in in- 
cumbents' expenditures than Jacobson's 7-variable model, and it does so 
with measures which more directly reflect both reaction to challenger 
behavior and to district characteristics, r The result predicts a base estimate 
of about $44,000 for incumbent expenditures in the post-July 1 period. 
Beyond this, incumbents who feel vulnerable are likely to spend an addi- 
tional $40,000. In addition, they are likely to spend $0.25 for every dollar 
spent by their opponent. Finally, incumbents raise and spend almost 
$2,000 additional for every percentage point below 50 that the partisan 
division in their district falls, and $2,000 less for every point above 50. 
Incumbents raise and spend money in reaction to the expenditures of the 
challenger as well as to their general feelings of vulnerability in this cam- 
paign. There is also a long-term component to the model, however, which 
affects the level of incumbent spending in U.S. House races -  the underly- 
ing distribution of partisanship in the district as measured through the 
normal vote. Incumbents representing districts historically sympathetic to 
their own party spend significantly less money than those from more com- 
petitive districts. 
It should be emphasized that this now becomes a model of general 
election campaign expenditures during the post-July 1 period. Incumbents 
may behave very differently during the first 18 months of their term, as 
they attempt to dissuade potential challengers from entering the race. 
Indeed, it can be argued that these early expenditures are extremely im- 
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portant in determining incumbency return rates. During the late cam- 
paign period, however, the model suggests that their spending behavior 
can be accounted for by three simple variables: the underlying partisan 
division in the district, the strength of the challenge, and candidates' own 
feelings of vulnerability. 
DEVIANT CASES: WHAT ELSE AFFECTS 
HOW MUCH INCUMBENTS SPEND? 
The model presented above accounts for better than one-half of the 
variance in incumbent spending in the general election period. Although 
part of the unexplained variation is undoubtedly due to measurement 
error, examination of deviant cases offers clues about additional factors 
which may affect how much incumbents spend, clues which provide guid- 
ance for future research.8 
An analysis of the residuals from the regression model showed that 8 
incumbents were substantial overspenders, involving amounts $30,000 or 
more above what was anticipated by our model; 3 were substantial under- 
spenders. In addition, 10 incumbents were moderate underspenders, in the 
range of $20,000 to $30,000; none were moderate overspenders. A reading 
of information available in The Almanac of American Politics and other 
publicly available sources provides further insight into the strategies and 
motivations of congressional candidates. Two types of situations appear to 
encourage overspending; two types appear to encourage underspending. 
Aspirations for higher party or elective office lead to high levels of ex- 
penditures by some incumbents who are electorally safe. They may spend 
in order to demonstrate their campaign skills or in order to impress col- 
leagues or interest groups with their electoral security. They may try to 
devastate their current challengers in order to discourage future challenges 
so that they can be free for a while to concentrate on House business or 
other concerns outside of their districts. They may also contribute to cam- 
paigns run by other candidates in order to establish political debts for 
future use. 
Some candidates overspend for career advancement. Incumbents who 
are thinking of seeking higher elective or party office may try to demon- 
strate their money-raising and vote-getting abilities. Some House members 
have a run for governor or the U.S. Senate in mind, and success at these 
two fundamental political skills can attract the attention of people back 
home, especially contributors and campaign organizers. Other members 
may be interested in advancing along a career path in the House, moving 
on to positions of greater leadership and responsibility. Raising large 
amounts of money, and sometimes distributing it to other members of the 
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state delegation or fellow committee members, can cement alliances which 
will come in handy in the future when assignments are being made. 
Some incumbents feel especially vulnerable because of unusual personal 
circumstances associated with their candidacies such as scandal, and there 
is evidence to suggest that they should be concerned (Peters and Welch, 
1980). The dichotomous measure of vulnerability incorporated in the 
model in Table 2 is inadequate to capture the extra burden of personal 
scandal which leads some incumbents to outspend their opponents by 
substantial sums. They view heavy spending as necessary to ensure victory. 
And even if the outcome is certain, candidates in traditionally safe districts 
want to return to comfortable margins of victory" sufficient to discourage 
future challenges. 
One obvious reason why some incumbents underspend is their inability 
to raise additional funds. Previous work on campaign finance gives the 
impression that incumbents have only to a sk - tha t  their ability to raise 
money is virtually unlimited. This impression is misleading when the 
amounts required are exceptionally large or when the incumbent's fund- 
raising skills are limited. An incumbent from the minor party in a district 
may have won an upset victory last term when national forces favored his 
or her party or when the opponent suffered from an unanticipated per- 
sonal problem. When making their first reelection bids, however, such 
incumbents may ha~e difficulty raising enough money to secure their seats, 
especially if the majority party can find a strong opponent to try to recap- 
ture the seat. 
The more eon-lmon underspenders are incumbents who feel so safe that 
they allow their challengers to outspend them. This may come from poor 
advice from campaign personnel as well as from confidence in the security 
of the seat. Only frequent and current political intelligence can alert the 
incumbent to the potential dangers of this strategy and provide a clue as to 
whether extra fund-raising activity should be undertaken. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The role of money in congressional campaigns is neither simple nor 
direct. Incumbents accumulate money and spend some of it even before 
their challengers are known. The effects of incumbents' campaign war 
chests on the strength of their challengers warrants further study. It is 
plausible to assume that incumbents are concerned about whom their 
challengers will be and that incumbents act strategically to enhance their 
security by discouraging serious opposition. Jaeobson and Kernell (1982; 
also Jaeobson, 1981) suggested that national economic conditions early in 
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the election year affect strategic calculations of potential challengers- that 
strong challengers choose to run when those economic conditions portend a 
national shift in their favor and to avoid running when national trends will 
hurt them. In addition to assessing national forces, these strategically so- 
phisticated challengers also carefully judge the vulnerability of their oppo- 
nents, including the amount of money available and already in the bank, 
and the plausibility of someone from their party attracting voter support in 
the district. Such considerations enter into the challengers' judgment about 
whether the time is propitious for a successful challenge. 
Of course, once the opponent is known, incumbents do react by raising 
and spending more money in response to well-financed challengers. Reac- 
tive spending has been documented in the general election, but it also 
probably occurs in primary races as well. Moreover, incumbents not only 
react in terms of total dollars, but also in terms of specific campaign 
techniques which they choose to employ. In even average television mar- 
kets, incumbents increase their reliance on television-based appeals in re- 
sponse to television advertising by their opponents (Campbell et al., 1984). 
They also shift the timing of their appeals in response to their opponents' 
behavior (Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984). 
Although clearly important, the concept of reactive spending alone does 
not account for all of the systematic variation in how much incumbents 
spend in their general election campaigns. Some incumbents spend more 
and others less than anticipated based solely upon the spending of their 
opponents. Feelings of vulnerabilit); based upon the underlying level of 
potential support for the opposition party (measured by the normal vote) 
or based upon other special circumstances surrounding the race, lead in- 
cumbents to spend more. A careful examination of individual cases which 
are not well explained by the regression model suggests that aspirations for 
higher elective or party office may also lead incumbents to spend more 
heavily than anticipated. An inability to raise money or the virtual cer- 
tainty of winning, regardless of their challengers' expenditures, sometimes 
produces situations where incumbents spend less than expected. A full 
model of incumbent expenditures awaits a systematic inquiry designed to 
test these ideas. 
The research reported here has implications for the future study of 
campaigns as well as for the policy debates over campaign finance. The 
findings suggest that discussions of alternative systems of public financing 
of congressional elections should incorporate some consideration of the 
timing of disbursements by" the agency responsible for the funds. Where 
candidate recruitment is concerned, when money becomes available can 
make as much difference as how much becomes available. Any procedure 
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designed to make the system more equitable by compensating for the ad- 
vantages of incumbency will need to address the flow of funds to candi- 
dates across the full electoral cycle. 
Without a required prior demonstration of strength or support in the 
district, it is hard to imagine how either a central government agency or 
state and local party organizations could make decisions regarding who is 
eligible for public money, especially early in the race. Yet, requiring such a 
demonstration before public funds can be made available would solidify in 
law another important advantage for incumbents. They would be able to 
fulfill such requirements tong before their challengers, 
In addition, ceilings on candidate expenditures may limit the ability of 
incumbents to maximize their margins. "While well-intentioned from the 
perspective of reducing overall costs and restoring balance to campaigns, 
undercutting heavy spending may have the unintended consequence of 
reducing the pool of qualified and experienced candidates for higher elec- 
tive or political office. Incumbents would be constrained in their ability to 
demonstrate initiative and competence regarding two of the most impor- 
tant campaign skills-fund-raising and vote getting. Many would un- 
doubtedly turn to other forms of behavior to showcase their interest in 
advancement. 
Finally, if campaigns become federally financed, campaign spending 
may increase in certain lopsided districts. Whereas some incumbents may 
not bother to raise and spend much in the face of minimal competition, 
they may feel compelled to accept federal contributions to their campaigns 
because their opponents will have more to spend. If heavier expenditures in 
lopsided districts leads to a better informed citizenry, then federal money 
would be well spent. However, there are many ways to spend (and waste) 
mone); and merely making more of it available in lopsided races is no 
guarantee of an improved information environment. 
For all of these reasons, it is now evident that more attention needs to be 
given to the strategic uses of money in the period leading up to the general 
election campaign. The notion of a campaign should be extended beyond 
the few months immediately prior to the general election, and the investi- 
gation of the strategic uses of money should be expanded beyond consider- 
ation of how general election opponents deal with each other. 
Acknowledgments. A version of this paper was prepared for the Annual Meeting 
of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 20-23, 1983. Portions 
of the data collection and analysis presented here were supported by Grant No. 
SOC 78-18710 from the National Science Foundation. The 1978 CPS American 
National Election Study data were collected under a grant from the National 
Science Foundation and supplied by the Inter-university Consortium for Political 
SPENDING IN U, S. HOUSE RACES t7 
and Social Research. Nei ther  the ICPSR nor NSF bears any responsibility for the  
analyses presented here. The  comput ing  support  of the Universi ty of Michigan is 
grateful ly acknowledged,  as well  as the assistance of Kent Cooper  at the Federal  
Elect ion Commiss ion and our  col league John Jackson. 
NOTES 
1. Of the 108 districts in the one-in-four sample of the 1978 CPS American National Election 
Study, 86 had both a Democrat and Republican opposing each other in the race for U.S. 
House of Representatives. These races form the basis for the analysis presented here, with 
information obtained from reports of their receipts and expenditures filed with the Federal 
Election Commission as well as interviews conducted with campaign managers for each 
candidate before and after the general election, in September-October 1978 and in Ja- 
nuary-February 1979. 
2. Our data show only 4 ineumbents with a deficit greater than $5,000; 24 who essentially 
broke even relative to their costs (plus or minus $5,000); 17 who had surpluses between 
$5,000 and $20,000; and 23 (one-third of the sample) who had surpluses greater than 
$20,000. For a discussion and examples of large surpluses in the 1982 elections, see Kenneth 
Noble's article in The New York Time.s, "Some in House Using Excess Cash For Expensive 
Living" (April 5, 1983). For 1984, George Lardner Jr:s article in The Washington Post 
National Weekly Edition, "How Much for a House Seat?" (April 29, 1985), describes how 
costs declined in 1984 but surpluses reached a record level. 
3. The data on receipts and expenditures over time were assembled from the series entitled 
"Candidate Index of Supporting Documents-  (E)" This is a summary of each candidate's 
dollar totals of receipts and expenditures with an indication of the election type, general or 
primary; as recorded by the candidate. 
4. As Jaeobson (1981) pointed out, the 1978 sample includes too few strong challengers to be 
representative of all House elections that year. If anything, that direction of bias in the 
sample probably leads to an underestimate of the amount of preemptive spending by 
incumbents. 
5. Estimating the normal vote with reliability for a large number of congressional districts is 
relatively difficult, but a reasonable estimate has been derived (Goldenberg and Traugott, 
1984) and is used in this analysis. 
6. Most researchers will not have survey-based measures of vulnerability available to them. In 
order to assess the relationship between the dichotomous variable used here and other more 
easily accessible data, a logit regression was run to predict incumbents' perceived vulnera- 
bility (distinguishing Sure Winners from Vulnerables) as a function of number of terms 
served, the difference between the 1976 vote margin and the district's normal vote, and the 
occurrence of a scandal during the last term. These measures were obtained from The 
Ahnanac of American Politics. Together, these three variables explain 63 % of the variance 
in the indicator of vulnerability, which is significant at the .02 level. The coefficients in the 
resulting equation, and their standard errors, are: 
Constant - .0426 .552 
Number of terms .9~502 .174 
1976 deviation from normal vote .0670 .043 
Presence of scandal .0335 .029 
7. Jacobson presented a regression equation as an estimation of his model for House races in 
1978, based upon all 305 incumbents who faced opposition, which accounts for 35% of the 
variance in incumbent spending. This equation was replicated as precisely as possible in 
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our sample of 71 incumbents who faced opposition, although some slight differences in 
certain independent variables probably remain. These differences may result from sam- 
piing errors, from slight differences in measurement, or from a bias in the sample of 
districts as Jacobson has suggested (1981). In our replication of Jacobson's model, the 
equation explains 44 % of the variance in incumbent spending and serves as the appropri- 
ate baseline for comparison with alternative specifications of the model. 
There are two important ways in which the measures of reactive spending used by 
Jaeobson can be improved in order to enhance the model's predictive power. The first 
involves using only general election expenditures by incumbents and their challengers 
rather than the 2-year totals. The second is to use an alternative measure of the strength of 
the challenger's party (CPS). Jacobson used the two-party vote share received by the 
opponent's party in the previous election as a measure of the relative strength of the two 
parties in the district. Yet, the concept calls for a baseline measure of partisan support 
against which the campaign effects of spending can be evaluated; Jacobson's measure is 
contaminated by campaign effects in the previous contest. A more appropriate measure of 
underlying partisan strength in the constituency is an estimate of the normal vote in the 
congressional district (Converse, 1966; Goldenberg and Traugott, 1981). With these im- 
provements, the predictive power of Jaeobson's model of reactive spending is increased by 
one-third, from 44 % to 58 %. The estimate moves from 27 cents per challenger dollar to 
almost 40 cents. There are certain other differences in the regression coefficients for some 
of the variables in the sample of raees. In particular, the party variable drops to insignifi- 
cance in the revised version. This may be due to the exclusion of money allocated to 
primaries in the measures of challengers' and incumbents' expenditures. 
8. There are several sources of error in variability. One is the variable used to capture general 
election expenditures. Although many primaries are over before July and some pre-July 
expenditures are appropriately considered general election spending, the choice of July 1 as 
the beginning date for general election expenditures does not appear to cause any method- 
ologieal difficult3,. Alternative equations were run predicting 1978 general election expend- 
itures where the measure captured all such expenditures after January" 1, 1978, and the 
results were virtually identical to those reported in Table 2, However, all FEC documents 
rely upon the campaign's designation of expenditures as "primary';' "general" or "other" 
and the meaning oJF these designations is not always clear. Just before the primary; spending 
is attributed to the primary. But what is spent long before the primary might be labeled 
either "primary" or "general" election expenditures. The significance of the post-July 
figures is that they, provide a standard for aggregating expenditures for a period which 
corresponds to the usual conception of the general election campaign and during which 
both opponents have already been selected. By including in the regression models only 
those general election expenditures made post-July, an incumbent's or a challenger's ex- 
penditures are sometimes underestimated. On the other hand, there is reasonable certainty 
that by July I the challenger is known and reactive spending is possible. The larger lesson 
here is that campaigns do not always distinguish between primary and general election 
spending, and perhaps it is necessary to broaden our view even further to look at the flow 
of money throughout the entire campaign. To do so requires detailed data on the amounts 
and purposes of expenditures over time, and that demands significant data collection and 
coding resources. 
A second source of measurement error is the estimate of the district's normal vote. 
Because adequate survey results were not available from each of the districts of interest, the 
normal vote had to be estimated through regression techniques referenced in note 5, 
Overall, this estimate has proved to be quite successful for systematic analysis, but errors in 
a specific estimate could contribute to a few large residuals. 
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Finally, the measure of uncertainty employed in Table 2 is dichotomous, although 
candidates obviously vary in terms of how uncertain they" feel, and any one candidate's 
level of uneertaint 3, may vary across the course of the campaign. 
REFERENCES 
Barone, Michael, Ujifusa, Grant, and Matthew, Douglas (1979). The Almanac o] 
American Politics 1980. New York: E. P. Dutton. 
Campbell, James E., Alford, John R., and Henry, Keith (1984). Television markets 
and congressional elections. Legislative Studies Quarterly 9:665-678. 
Converse, Philip E. (1966). The concept of a normal vote. In Angus Campbell, 
Philip E. Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald E. Stokes (eds.), Elections and 
the Political Order, pp. 9-39. New York: Wiley. 
Cover, Albert D. (1977). One good term deserves another: The advantage of in- 
cumbency in congressional elections. American Journal o] Political Science 21: 
523-542. 
Cover, Albert D., and Brumberg, Bruce S. (1982). Baby books and ballots: The 
impact of congressional mail on constituent opinions. American Political Science 
Review 76:347-359. 
Fenno, Richard E Jr. (1978). Home Style: House Members in their Districts. Bos- 
ton: Little, Brown. 
Fiorina, Morris P. (1974). Representatives, Roll Calls and Constituencies. Lex- 
ington, Mass.: D. C. Heath. 
Fiorina, Morris P. (1977). The case of the vanishing marginals: The bureaucracy 
did it. American Political Science Review 71:177-181. 
Goldenberg, Edie N., and Traugott, Michael W. (1984). Campaigning ]or Con- 
gress. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press. 
Hinckley, Barbara (1980). House reelections and Senate defeats: The role of the 
challenger. British ]ournal of Political Science 10:441-460. 
Jacobson, Gary C. (1978). The effects of campaign spending in congressional elec- 
tions. American Political Science Review 72:469-491. 
Jacobson, Gary C. (1980a). Money in Congressional Elections. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Jacobson, Gary C. (1980b). Congressional elections, 1978: The case of the vanish- 
ing challengers. Paper presented at the Conference on Congressional Elections, 
Rice University and the University of Houston, Houston, Texas, Jan. 10-12. 
Jacobson, Gary C. (1981). Strategic politicians and congressional elections, 
1946-1980. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, New York, Sept. 3-6. 
]acobson, Gary C. and Kernell, Samuel E. (1982). Strategy and Choice in Congres- 
sional Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Lardner, George Jr. (1985, April 29). How much for a House seat? The Washington 
Post National Weekly Edition. 
Mayhew, David R. (1974a). Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
20 GOLDENBERG, TRAUGOTT, AND BAUMGARTNER 
Mayhew, David R. (1974b). Congressional elections: The case of the vanishing 
marginals. Polity 6:295-317. 
Noble, Kenneth B. (1983, April 5). Some in House using excess election cash for 
expensive living. New York Times. 
Peters, J. G., and Welch, S. (1980). The effects of charges of corruption on voting 
behavior in congressional elections. American Political Science Review 
74:697-708. 
Ragsdale, Lyn (1981). Incumbent popularity, challenger invisibility, and congres- 
sional voters. Legislative Studies Quarterly 6:201-218, 
Traugott, Michael W., and Goldenberg, Edie N. (1981). Normal vote analysis of 
U.S. congressional elections. Legislative Studies Quarterly 6:247-257. 
Welch, William P. (1980). The allocation of political monies: economic interest 
groups. Public Choice 35:97-120. 
